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SARA K N O X
Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows.
If you only knew how strange it is to be there. It is a world without sound, without
c o l o u r. Everything there—the earth, the trees, the people, the water and the air—is
dipped in monotonous gre y. Grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, grey eyes in gre y
faces, and the leaves of the trees are ashen gre y. It is not life but its shadow, it is not
motion but its soundless spectre .
H e re I shall try to explain myself, lest I be suspected of madness or indulgence in
symbolism. I was at Aumont’s and saw Lumière ’s cinématograph—moving photography.
Maxim Gorky, July 1896.1
What there is on the screen is nothing but shadows. Something even more dead than
w o rd s .
Orson Welles, 1971.2
Cinema is the art of ghosts.
Jacques Derrida, 1983.3
S p o o k y, isn’t it?!4
As we know, it is a cliché that what we see on the screen is ghosts, phantoms, spectre s .
What I propose in this essay is that that cliché be taken seriously—do I dare say it, ‘deadly’
seriously—be given rigorous analytic attention for its relevance to the thinking of cinema
and its senses, while at the same time acknowledging that even the finest account must come
face to face with the ‘fact’ that there is no ghostbuster, not even the analyst/theorist of cinema,
the crypt, 
the haunted house, o f c i n e m a
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not even the Marxist analyst/theorist of cinema, so powerful as to master, defeat and eradi-
cate the spectre of cinema.5 Indeed, this is what for me, after Raymond Bellour, cinema is
never not telling us, its analysts.6 For Derrida, all analysis is enabled by the spectre, is itself
a conjuring of the spectre. For him, the spectre is not of the order of ontology but of hauntol-
o g y. He writes, ‘Ontology opposes it [hauntology] only in a movement of exorcism. Ontol-
ogy is a conjuration’.7 Ontology wishes to conjure away the spectre that enables, conjure s ,
it. The hauntological makes every concept a concept of the spectre and a spectre of a concept.8
It is a key premise of this essay that not only is the spectre a privileged subject of film but
that it would be the ur figure of cinema, if cinema could have an ur figure, if the spectre could
be an ur figure, a figure not only operating at every second at every level in every aspect of
e v e ry film but also at the level of the cinematic, or rather animatic, apparatus of film,
hence at the level of film ‘as such’.
But since for me there is no essence to film as there is no essence to the spectre, any ur
f i g u re would, of necessity, call for its putting in quotation marks, under erasure (sous rature) .
The very figure of cinema, the figure of the figure(s) of cinema, would be this thing, this
nothing, of which Derrida speculates: ‘the figure of the ghost is not just one figure among
others. It is perhaps the hidden figure of all figure s ’ .9 This would mean that in cinema we
find a privileged, exemplary instance of this ‘figure of all figure s ’ .1 0 F u rt h e rm o re, insofar as
for Derrida ‘the spectrogenic process corresponds to a paradoxical i n c o r p o r a t i o n’—the cry p-
tic incorporation—the cinema is for me not only a privileged, exemplary instance of that
p rocess of the spectre but also at the same time a privileged, exemplary instance of cry p t i c
i n c o r p o r a t i o n .1 1 The crypt of cinema would be for me the artifactual, prosthetic ‘body’, that
space of invisible visibility and visible invisibility, of the cinema ‘itself ’ become not only
the host for the spectres it images but itself a ghost, a second spectre, that spectre for
which the spectator–subject and the world are the host, even as such hosting thereby makes
s p e c t res of them as it at the same time makes a host of the spectres of cinema.
But what, more pre c i s e l y, is the cryptic incorporation? Te l l i n g l y, it is in a film, Ken
M c M u l l e n ’s Ghost Dance, that Derrida offers a brief description of it. Te l l i n g l y, too, as part of
his improvised commentary, he describes h i m s e l f as a phantom, even as his cameo role and
his sudden surprising appearance (and reappearances) in the film possess for me a spectral
c h a r a c t e r. He declare s :
F reud. We were talking about the ghost of Freud just now. You know, ghosts don’t come.
They re t u rn (re v i e n n e n t). As we say in French, they are re v e n a n t s. That presupposes a mem-
o ry of the past that was never under the form of presence. But I’ve been intrigued by a cert a i n
t h e o ry which some psychoanalyst friends, Nicolas Abraham, who is now dead, and Maria
To rok, have developed from Freud. Their theory of ghosts is based in fact on a theory of
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m o u rning. In normal mourning, Freud says, one interiorizes the dead. One takes it into one-
self, one assimilates it; and that interiorization is idealization. It accepts the dead. Where-
as in mourning that doesn’t develop norm a l l y, a work of mourning that goes wrong, there
is no true interiorization. There is what Abraham and To rok call an i n c o r p o r a t i o n. The
dead is taken into us but doesn’t become a part of us. It occupies a particular place in our
b o d y. It can speak on its own. It can haunt and ventriloquize our own proper body and our
own proper speech. So that the ghost becomes enclosed in a crypt in us, a sort of graveyard
for the ghost. A ghost can be also not only our proper unconscious but more precisely the
unconscious of the other. It is the unconscious of the other which speaks in our place. It is
not only our unconscious but the unconscious of the other that can play tricks on us which
speaks in our place. It can be terrifying, it can be terrifying. But that’s when things re a l l y
s t a rt to happen.
It is in his essay ‘F o r s ’, which introduces Nicolas Abraham and Maria To ro k ’s The Wo l f
M a n ’s Magic Wo rd: A Cry p t o n y m y, that Derrida provides an extended articulation of cry p t i c
i n c o r p o r a t i o n .1 2 I shall let the next few paragraphs serve to encapsulate its key features, with
occasional commentary on my part .
C ryptic incorporation is for Derrida what mimes or simulates the process of intro j e c t i o n
while not effectuating the completion of mourning that introjection accomplishes. While
i n t ro j e c t i o n is of the order of presence, re p resentation, the subject, the spirit, the ontologi-
cal, i n c o r p o r a t i o n is of the order of the simulacrum, the object, the spectre, the hauntologi-
cal. Its ‘in-’ is not merely the banal ‘in-’ of the inside as a fullness of presence of in-tro j e c t i o n
but the fatal, radical ‘in-’ as the irreducibly ‘in-’ between, the ‘in-’ between as itself the secre t :
what would be for Derrida the outside as the inside of the inside or of the outside and the
inside as the outside of the outside or of the inside.1 3 With incorporation what is constituted
as inner enclave within us remains unassimilated. Derrida writes: ‘the walled surfaces of the
c rypt create an innermost heart of hearts … which is an excluded outsider inside’.1 4
Incorporation, the simulation of introjection, is nostalgic for what it itself forever staves
o ff: the resolution, reconciliation, closure which introjection aff o rds. Incorporation is of the
o rder of the irreconcilable. It operates ‘to keep a corpse intact, safe both from life and fro m
death, which could both come in from the outside to touch it’.1 5 For Derrida, ‘The inhabi-
tant of a crypt is always a living dead, a dead entity we are perfectly willing to keep alive, but
a s dead, one we are willing to keep, as long as we keep it, within us, intact in any way save
a s l i v i n g ’ .1 6
The cryptic incorporation thus always marks an effect of impossible or refused mourn-
ing. What is kept safe—this Thing—is, like the simulacral nature of the crypt and of cry p-
tic incorporation, of the order of l i f e d e a t h: both dead and alive, neither dead nor alive, at the
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same time. Kept alive as dead and dead as alive, in a word, as the undead, the cryptic object
is a foreign body—a stranger—kept within the Self as foreign, expropriated by any attempt
to appropriate and synthesise it with the Self.1 7 Which means not only that the work of
m o u rning cannot be completed, but also that the incorporation is never finished.
For Derrida, the crypt is the monument to a catastrophe. According to the strange logic
of cry p t o n y m y, any attempt to decrypt the crypt(ic) only serves to encrypt it. In trying to
d e s t roy it, it can only be consolidated.1 8 A c c o rding to its logic, the self becomes a ‘lodging,
the haunt of a host of ghosts’.19 The subject so constituted would be ‘particularly resistant to
analysis, a subject carrying within him a “puzzle of shards about which we would know
nothing: neither how to put it together nor how to recognize most of the pieces” ’ .2 0
F i n a l l y, let me note this point of Derr i d a :
The crypt is always an internalization, an inclusion intended as a compromise, but since it
is a parasitic inclusion, an inside heterogeneous to the inside of the Self, an outcast in the
domain of general introjection within which it violently takes its place, the cryptic safe
can only maintain in a state of repetition the mortal conflict it is impotent to re s o l v e .2 1
The strange, irreconcilable, irresolvable topography of the crypt—at once ‘inside outside
and outside inside’, both inside and outside, neither inside nor outside, at the same time—
is for me the topography, or rather atopography, the (non)place, of the place of cinema, place
of ‘the unconscious of the other’. ‘As such’, the crypt d e c o n s t ru c t s the time-honoured dis-
tinctions between inside and outside (as in inside and outside the movie theatre), between
self and other, subject and object, character and spectator, cinema and world. Even as the
c rypt of cinema would incorporate the ghost in the host, and vice versa, making it impos-
sible to say which is which, it would incorporate all these other oppositions cry p t i c a l l y. As
c rypt, the cinema would encrypt in the figure of the spectre what cannot ever be simply
d e c rypted, determined and resolved, even as it would mean that mourning and melancholia
would be engaged in an endless exercise to exorcise the ghost, even while maintaining it
by that very pro c e s s .
As spectre, the cinema is never not of the order of the living dead. It always re t u rn s
f rom death, lives with death and re t u rns to it, that is, always re t u rns from, lives with and
re t u rns to the cry p t . Even as spectre and crypt are never not inextricably coimplicated, never
not irreconcilably ghosted and cryptically incorporated in the other—the spectre that haunts
its crypt, that makes whatever it haunts its crypt, the crypt that always encrypts the spectre —
so too they together are never not haunting and cryptically incorporating cinema as its very
condition of possibility and at the same time impossibility. The life of the spectre in and of
the crypt, the life of the spectre in and of the crypt of cinema, is that of l i f e d e a t h, at once
the life of death and the death of life, life and death inextricably coimplicated, haunted, cry p-
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tically incorporated, making it impossible to determine, reconcile and resolve them—life
and death—individually and jointly, even as they cryptically incorporate the world and
the spectator–subject, and vice versa.
H e re let me pause to enumerate the names of the spectre, so that while I may name but
one or two, these others will ghost such a naming. Such names include apparition, dop-
p e l g ä n g e r, ghost, phantasm, phantasma (the last two notably giving us phantasmagoria),
phantom, phasm, poltergeist, revenant, shade, shadow, spirit, spook, sprite, wraith, and
m o re. Their names are legion.
In taking the spectre as ‘ur’ figure of cinema, with the qualification I made earlier, I take
a cue from the fact that the spectre is a privileged subject of film, even giving birth to its ‘own’
g e n re—the ghost film—a staple of cinema from its earliest days to the most recent of
times. Between 1896 and 1907, a rash of haunted hotel, castle, inn, manoir and chateaux
films were made, such as Georges Méliès’s L’Hôtel Empoisonné (1896), Le Manoir du Diable
(1896), Le Chateau Hanté (1897), L’ A u b e rge Ensorc e l é e (1897) and Le Revenant ( 1 9 0 3 ) ;
G . A . S m i t h ’s The Haunted Castle (1897); Thomas Edison’s Uncle Josh in a Spooky Hotel ( 1 9 0 0 ) ;
and J. S t u a rt Blackton’s The Haunted Hotel (1907). More recent examples of this genre include
P o l t e rg e i s t (1982), Evil Dead (1983), G h o s t b u s t e r s (1984), B e e t l e j u i c e (1988), G h o s t ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,
Ghost Dad (1990), Truly Madly Deeply (1991), C a s p e r (1995)—to say nothing of the Japanese
ghost films such as U g e t s u (1953), K w a i d a n (1964), E m p i re of Passion (1978), Ghost in The
S h e l l (1995). Then there are all those films that acknowledge that special relation between
film and the spectre by marking their titles with the sign of the ghost and the haunted house,
for example, The Phantom of The Opera.
M o re o v e r, I take a cue from the many comments by perceptive observers of cinema, start-
ing at the very beginning of such comment. Here I wish to re t u rn to my opening epigraph
f rom the Russian writer Maxim Gorky: ‘Last night I was in the Kingdom of Shadows’. These
w o rds open his 4 July 1896 review of his first experience of the Lumière Bros’ cinematograph
at Aumont’s at the Nizhni-Novgorod fair. It stands for me as the first substantial account of
the experience of cinema by its spectator–analyst. In his seminal text, ‘An Aesthetic of Aston-
ishment: Film and The (In)credulous Spectator’, Tom Gunning not only describes Gorky’s
review as ‘the most detailed and articulate account we have of an early Lumière pro j e c-
tion’, he uses it as the lynchpin for his revision of our understanding of the nature of the
earliest form of cinematic spectatorship.2 2 He uses Gorky to argue—against both traditional
accounts of the naive spectator and ‘certain contemporary theorisations of spectatorship …
[that] envision audiences submitting passively to an all-dominating apparatus, hypnotised
and transfixed by its illusionist power’—that the first cinema spectators were quite sophis-
ticated, clued in to the attractions of cinema by their familiarity with the attractions of magic
t h e a t re, even as they were inveterate consumers of modern urban life.2 3 If anything, for
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Gunning these spectators tended to a mastery of the experience, maintaining, as Gorky does
for him, their recognition of the illusion of the experience while at the same time know-
ingly immersing themselves in it.
In fact, Gorky appears to define for Gunning, as he does for me, the very experience of
cinema spectatorship (and for me too, cinema analysis). Such ‘ur’ experience persists with
G u n n i n g ’s enduring aesthetic (and there f o re cinema) of attractions, which for him pro-
vides ‘an underg round current flowing beneath narrative logic and diegetic realism’—in other
w o rds, beneath his cinema of narrative integration—and then re - e m e rges in the ‘Spielberg -
Lucas-Coppola cinema of effects’ in the 1970s and 1980s.2 4 The increasing virt u a l i s a t i o n
of that cinema of (special) eff e c t s re p resents for me the ironisation by hyperreal ‘cinema’ of
André Bazin’s dream of an integral realism of cinema, even as the attraction produces those
moments that for me at once enable and disenable Gunning’s cinema of narrative integra-
tion and his formulation of it.2 5 Not only does the cinematic attraction produce within the
cinema of narrative integration for Gunning ‘those moments of cinematic dépaysement b e l o v e d
by the surre a l i s t s ’ , insofar as for him the attraction is never not flowing beneath the cinema
of narrative integration, it is never not for me producing by that very flow the d é p a y s e m e n t —
t h e u p rooting, rendering homeless (with its association with the uncanny)—of that cinema:
the ontological at once enabled and disenabled by the hauntological.2 6
It should be noted that Gunning understands his re f o rmulation of the cinematic spectator
in the mould of Gorky as challenging not only the standard take on the earliest spectator but
even Christian Metz’s ‘subtle’ reading of the legendary terror of the first audience ‘as a dis-
placement of the contemporary viewer’s credulity onto a mythical childhood of the medium’,
onto ‘an audience from the infancy of cinema’.2 7 For Gunning, Metz still maintains an attach-
ment to that primal audience, introjecting, projecting and mythicising that legendary first
audience, placing the naive credulous spectator inside the incredulous one, or, as Metz puts
it, ‘still seated beneath the incredulous one, or in his heart’—a critique to which I shall re t u rn .2 8
For me, as it appears for Gunning, Gorky’s review is singular for its time in its attempt
to characterise the nature and experience of ‘moving photography’ in the most accurate and
ample way possible. Gorky writes of the cinematograph: ‘the extraord i n a ry impression it
c reates is so unique and complex that I doubt my ability to describe it with all its nuances.
H o w e v e r, I shall try to convey its fundamentals.’2 9 It is a review marked by a rich, and
richly complex, spectrum of idea and affect, so rich and complex in fact that, in conveying
‘its fundamentals’, it strikes for me all the major notes and chords that more recent com-
mentators will isolate as pertinences not only of the early cinema but also of cinema ‘as such’.
It is a review so singular for its time and for the fundamentals it conveys of that first experience
of cinema that Colin Harding and Simon Popple name their book after it—In The Kingdom
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of Shadows—and situate it at the beginning of their first section of the book, entitled ‘The
First Sight’, leading into it by declaring of this review and the others, ‘but what above all
characterises these responses to the first sight of the cinema, whether favourable or not, is a
sense that something irrevocable has come to pass’.3 0
For me, Gorky’s ‘first sight’ of cinema offers us a rich guide to those qualities of the cinema
and its senses whose address is the brief of this essay. It is a guide that not only already appre-
hends the uniqueness and complexity of cinema but is already s h a d o w e d by a doubt about the
ability to describe it fully. And more. It is a guide to the experience of the Kingdom of
Shadows, and written by someone who has been there and re t u rned from it, who speculates
upon cinema and its experience pre-eminently in terms of the spectre, the ghost, the shadow.
Let me quote a bit of Gorky in this re g a rd :
N o i s e l e s s l y, the ashen-grey foliage of the trees sways in the wind, and the grey silhouettes
of the people, as though condemned to eternal silence and cruelly punished by being deprived
of all the colours of life, glide noiselessly along the grey gro u n d .
B e f o re you a life is surging, a life deprived of words and shorn of the living spectrum of
colours—the gre y, the soundless, the bleak and dismal life.
It is terrifying to see, but it is the movement of shadows, only of shadows. Curses and
ghosts, the evil spirits that have cast entire cities into eternal sleep, come to mind and you
feel as though Merlin’s vicious trick is being enacted before you. As though he had bewitched
the entire street …
T h ree men seated at the table, playing cards … It seems as if these people have died
and their shadows have been condemned to play cards in silence unto etern i t y.
The Kingdom of Shadows Gorky characterises is the Kingdom of shades, ghosts, spectre s ,
evil spirits. This Kingdom is for me Hades, the underworld, the land of the spirits of the
dead, but of the dead who re t u rn to haunt the living as the living dead. This Kingdom, this
e m p i re of phantoms, is the Kingdom of Cinema. This Kingdom is ruled by Pluto (called Dis
by the Romans) and by Satan. It is a land of the devil, of the evil demon. Its experiencing by
Gorky induces in him overpowering affects cogently re g i s t e red in the following passage:
This mute, grey life finally begins to disturb and distress you. It seems as though it carr i e s
a warning, fraught with a vague but sinister meaning that makes your heart grow faint. Yo u
a re forgetting where you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind and your consciousness
begins to wane and grow dim …
But suddenly, alongside of you, a gay chatter and a provoking laughter of a woman is
h e a rd … and you remember that you are at Aumont’s, Charles Aumont’s …
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The text ‘resolves’ itself into a set of strongly stated antinomies—p ro home and family, the
‘clean, toiling life’, the Good, the idyll, the bucolic, and a n t i vice, Evil, family squabbles (what
t h reatens to undo the family, the familiar), the market, fashion. Gorky wonders why such
an invention, which ‘could probably be applied to the general ends of science, that is, of bet-
tering man’s life and the developing of his mind’, should be demonstrated at Aumont’s, ‘where
vice alone is being encouraged and popularised’—and his answer is for me already impli-
cit in his question. For Gorky, such an experience of this Kingdom is a deeply shocking—
five ‘suddenly’s mark it—destabilising one, in terms of both sense and sensation. Or should
we not ‘simply’ say s e n s e, to note its undecidable character as idea and feeling, as mental and
physical, a term that deconstructs itself.3 1 It is an experience so traumatic in fact that he fears
for his body and mind, fears for his life, fears for his grasp of re a l i t y, fears for his sanity, fears
that the strange reality of cinema is displacing and supplanting his familiar, familial re a l i t y,
t u rning himself and his world, I would suggest, not only upside down—as Gunning tends
to do to traditional and Marxist film theoretical accounts of cinematic spectatorship via
G o r k y ’s account, even as Marxist film theoretical accounts themselves play the simple inversion
game—but inside out.
H e re let me pause to make a few comments on Gunning’s take on Gorky and Metz. En-
deavouring to avoid that for which he criticises Metz, Gunning nonetheless, as it were ,
falls into the same ‘traps’ in tending to introject, project and mythicise Gorky as primal spec-
t a t o r, one who, in complete opposition to the legendary, totally passive, slave, ‘dupe’
model of the early film spectator, is a totally active, ‘all-knowing’, urban sophisticate master
—a simple inversion that produces a contradiction in Gunning’s characterisation of Gorky
as spectator, as it does in Gunning’s own role. To wit, Gunning, on the one hand, attempts
to forge a ‘both/and’ model for describing the cinema and its spectator—both believing and
i n c redulous at the same time—modelled on Gorky, while, on the other hand, buying into
an either/or binary, assuming the position of master demystifying showman-theorist—
modelled also on Gorky—who could simply stand outside the experience, be it as spec-
tator–analyst or as showman–theorist. While Gunning would wish that Gorky support
and be his master demystifying showman–theorist–spectator according to the either/or binary,
modelling his own operations as theorist there b y, my reading of Gorky begins by situating
him at the least on that other side of Gunning’s dual reading of him, in the ‘both/and’ cate-
g o ry that Gunning in fact s h a re s with Metz in characterising the early film spectator.
But rather than engage in an extended analysis of the complexities of the arg u m e n t s
over projection and introjection, I wish to add cryptic incorporation to the equation. This
addition would deconstruct a simple either/or model of projection and introjection, as it
would a simple active-master/passive-slave ‘dupe’ model of the film spectator–theorist that
would simply situate the adult in the former category and the naif, the child and the primi-
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tive in the latter. Indeed, the deconstructive force of cryptic incorporation would go a step
f u rther to deconstruct a simple ‘both/and’ model with its ‘both/and, neither/nor, at the same
time’—both adult and child, neither simply adult nor simply child, at the same time—
acknowledging the impossibility of keeping the opposing terms of the binary, any b i n a ry,
separate and discrete, acknowledging their inextricable coimplication, indetermining, 
reversibility and i rre c o n c i l a b i l i t y. And what is thereby acknowledged are the limits of the pro-
ductivist modelling of cinema and of film theory, the limits of the film theorist’s ability 
to master film, and the superior, uncanny, cryptic powers of the cinema and its seduction 
of film theory, turning it into a special effect, while keeping the ‘secret’ of the cinema 
s a f e (f o r s) .3 2
As part of his tendency to read and keep Gorky as master of the experience of cinema,
t h e reby in my opinion misreading Gorky, Gunning errs in tending to characterise Gorky’s
experience as merely one of ennui, of boredom. Even when Gunning expands those term s
to include vague discomfort, depression and malaise, he tends to try to confine that range
to an intellectual rather than emotional reaction so that Gorky remains totally outside of and
immune to cinema’s uncanny effects. To the contrary, I believe Gorky offers us not only a
complex range of contradictory, irreconcilable senses arising from his immersion in the expe-
rience but an account of the unaccountable as the experience of cinema. His ‘account’ canvasses
all the features that would make his experience ‘ur’ scene and ‘ur’ sense of cinema—the
u n c a n n y experience of cinema—with its simultaneous thrills and chills, delights and frights,
attractions and repulsions—indeed, the thrills of the chills, the delights of the frights, the
attractions of the repulsions, and vice versa—with its making of the strange (Gorky’s ‘If you
only knew how strange it is to be there’) familiar and the familiar strange at the same time,
and with its terrifying re t u rn of death, re t u rning in the form of the ghost, the spectre — a n d
with it of necessity the re t u rn of the experiences of mourning and melancholia and of
c ryptic incorporation.
I would, there f o re, propose that what Gorky describes as his experience of cinema would
be the effect of the spectre, the spectre of cinema and its whole set of aff e c t s / s h o c k s /
a t t r a c t i o n s —the Cryptic Complex of the uncanny, the re t u rn of death as spectre, endless mourn -
ing and melancholia and cryptic incorporation.3 3 One might say that the affect of cinema would
be the special effect of the spectre. Furt h e rm o re, I would argue that, in characterising the
complex logics and operations of the experience of cinema with such loaded terms as ‘canny’
and ‘uncanny’, Gunning himself supports my reading. In fact, for me all that Gunning says
of the advent of the cinema is already in Fre u d ’s logics of the uncanny. For me, the attrac-
tion, film and a fort i o r i animation are of the order of the uncanny.3 4 Indeed, I propose here
they are of the order of the Cryptic Complex, which is ‘itself’ of the order of the animatic, as
a re the elements that compose this complex.
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To nominate the uncanny as ‘ur’ sense of cinema would have the consequence of re s u r-
recting and ‘re a ff i rming’ the inscription of childhood for which Gunning challenges Metz, for
the uncanny has to do with the re t u rn of what gave us a fright when we were children to give
us a fright again as adults. It suggests that the adult is never only adult but always at the same
time child, too, even as it posits two sides to itself—the psychological and the anthro p o l o g i c a l
—two necessarily commingled, cryptically incorporated sides, which means that what re t u rn s
f rom one’s own childhood is allied with what re t u rns from the childhood of the human:our
primitive animistic fears of the re t u rn of the dead. And in both the nature of animation is
at stake. Such would be the primal experience of cinema, a shocking, traumatic experience
that even the sophisticated Gorky rehearses for us. Metz’s ‘audience from the infancy of
cinema’ is the audience uncannily re t u rned by cinema to the infancy, the childhood, of the
individual and the human. One might say, re t u rned to children of the night, as Dracula would
have it!
Of course, to ‘discover’ that when you are in the cinema, you are in the Kingdom of
Shadows, to ‘discover’ that when you are in the cinema, your world and you have died and
been re s u rrected as shadow, as spectre, that even as cinema has become the spectre of your
world and you, your world and you have become the spectres of cinema, that even as cinema
has cryptically incorporated your world and you, your world and you have cryptically incor-
porated cinema, that there is a stranger, a spectre, encrypted in your world and you such
that your world and you are forever strangers to themselves, never able to touch, close upon
and secure themselves—this re t u rn of death and the indeterminacy and emotions that arr i v e
in its wake would be terr i f y i n g .35 For me, the traumatic advent of cinema violently opened
a wound—a wound in a sense never closed, a posthumous wound—in ‘reality’, as well as in
the ‘self’, the ‘subject’, a wound no amount of suturing (and its system) could close.3 6
It is no surprise that at a certain point Gorky reacts against all this ‘nonsense’, trying to
c o n j u re away, to exorcise, to repudiate, the spectre and to reinstate the comforting, re a s s u r-
ing, hierarchical, resolvable either/or: reality or illusion; outside or inside (as in outside
the film and its effect or immersed in it); Charles Aumont’s or the cinematograph; Good or
Evil; master or dupe.3 7 As Gunning reacts against the spectre too. But, for me, Gorky’s thre e
ellipsis points three times mark his haunting, even as those points mark the haunting of
B a u d e l a i re ’s poet by the p a s s a n t e, that fugitive apparition of a woman in mourning who at
once comes to pass and passes to come of whom Walter Benjamin and Samuel Weber write—
the p a s s a n t e, another spectre of cinema.3 8
Gunning is alert to the relevance of the uncanny for his account of Gorky, at least to a
d e g ree. He himself declares that Gorky ‘stresses the uncanny effect of the new attraction’s
mix of realistic and non-realistic qualities’; but he constrains his thinking of the uncanny to
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this mix, thereby not taking on board the thinking of Freud on the uncanny for the thinking
of Gorky and his experience of cinematic spectatorship.3 9 This thinking is essential to another
of Gunning’s key points which he grounds in Gorky, as well as in Méliès and Blackton, that
is, that the ‘ur’ attraction/shock/experience of cinema—the experience in and by which it
demonstrates its powers to the spectator—is the sudden transformation, the ‘magical meta-
morphosis’, from the ‘all too familiar’ still photographic image to the all too strange mobile
cinematographic image of living moving shadows of people and things. Quoting Gorky’s
famous description of it—‘Suddenly a strange flicker passes through the screen and the pic-
t u re stirs to life’—Gunning sums up this process, what he calls ‘this cataclysmic event’, as
‘this still projection takes on motion, becomes endowed with animation, and it is this un-
believable moving image that so astounds’.4 0
But no more than Fre u d ’s uncanny does Gunning address the implications of animation
for this process, an uncanny, animatic process by which, arg u a b l y, the inanimate becomes
not merely animate but ‘animate inanimate’, even as the animate becomes not mere l y
inanimate but likewise ‘animate inanimate’.4 1 The ‘animate inanimate’ would be ‘living
photography’, the term announced on the advertisement outside Aumont’s for the wonder
p roduced by the Lumière cinematograph.4 2 This uncanny, animatic process connects the
‘living pictures’ of cinema to the ‘living statues’ of classical times, both offering an experience
of the re t u rn of the dead as living dead, not too alive, not too dead, both alive and dead,
neither alive nor dead, at the same time. The re t u rn of the dead as spectre , at the least a
double ghosting in the case of cinema: the image itself and what it images—living moving
shadows of people and things. And a third as well: the strange flicker that passes thro u g h
the screen! Cert a i n l y, Bart h e s ’s treatment of the distinction between photograph and film
in Camera Lucida would support such a reading, although for me the relation of photograph
and cinema would be more complicated, one form of lifedeath ghosting another. Is it not
that uncanny sense of the dead re t u rning to life and at the same time the living re t u rn i n g
to death that informs Gorky’s response, one Gunning takes as model, a response that re-
peatedly characterises these living moving forms as shadows, spectre s ?
So while the process moves from the all too familiar to the all too strange, the all too strange
also turns out to be something all too familiar, the things that frightened us when we were
c h i l d ren but had thought we had surmounted now that we are adults. Fre u d ’s characteris-
ation of the uncanny means not simply that the familiar becomes strange but that one is con-
f ronted with something strangely familiar and familiarly strange at the same time. We are
c o n f ronted with the re t u rn of ghosts, of spectres, whose haunting of ourselves we thought
we had surpassed. We feel occupied, in our inside—in our ‘innermost heart of heart s ’ — b y
what is most strange, distant, thre a t e n i n g .4 3
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In Specters of Marx, Derrida asks:
Why does Freud consider haunting to be ‘perhaps the most striking of all [examples]’,
‘a kind of prototype, in the experience of U n h e i m l i c h k e i t?’ Because many people experience
‘in the highest degree’ (im allerhochsten Grade) the sense of the ‘unheimlich’ ‘in relation to
death and dead bodies, to the re t u rn of the dead, and to spirits and ghosts’ (G e i s t e rn und
G e s p e n s t e rn) .4 4
And Derrida highlights Fre u d ’s comment: ‘Some languages in use to-day can only render the
G e rman expression “an u n h e i m l i c h house” by “a h a u n t e d h o u s e ” ’ .4 5
Insofar as for me cinema bears a privileged relation to the uncanny, insofar as cinema’s ‘ur’
sense and experience would be that of the uncanny, cinema too could be thought of its kind
‘ p e rhaps the most striking of all [examples]’, ‘a kind of prototype, in the experience of U n h e i m -
l i c h k e i t’. The crypt, the haunted house, of cinema would be Fre u d ’s ‘u n h e i m l i c h house’, and
vice versa.
The uncanny nature of the cinema, marked in the event of its advent as described by
Gunning, turns the sense of being at home that the spectator felt before the image started to
t u rn from still photograph to mobile cinematograph—the experience of being at an all too
familiar spectacle—into a sense of being homeless—u n h e i m l i c h—with its movement, its
t u rning, its d é p a y s e m e n t, its ‘coming to life’, its coming-to-pass—its animation. (Here, the
e x p ression ‘coming to life’ needs qualification, a curious locution insofar as I would suggest
that life can never be come to, nor death. In any case, it is the illusion of life to which for me
this expression alludes—Gorky’s ‘not life but its shadow … not motion but its soundless
s p e c t re’.) So, too, the relation between film and world becomes homeless, uncanny, as each—
film and world—invades, cryptically incorporates and indetermines the other. To be in the
house (c a s a) of cinema is not to be in the d o m u s—the home. Its refuge could never be pure
refuge, any more than it could be pure non-refuge. Like the spectre, the movie theatre is of
the order of the between. To be in it is to be in the haunted house, the crypt, of cinema, c h e z
c i n e m a ,4 6 in the ‘bio-box’ of cinema, in the place of licit illicitness that Metz describes in ‘The
I m a g i n a ry Signifier’,47 a place akin to a maison de tolérance, which it appears Gorky was next
to when he saw the Lumière cinematograph!4 8
For me, cinema is not only uncanny. The advent of the cinema is an uncanny advent,
replayed every time a film is projected—as well as, to not overlook its importance, every
time the projection ends, as well as every time an attraction, a ‘suddenly’, erupts to shock
the spectator—the posthumous shock of the uncanny, followed by the posthumous after-
shock of mourning and melancholia. In ‘The Age of the World as Moving Picture’, as I call it,
not only does cinema (that is, film animation) double the photograph, it doubles the subject,
the self and the world. Even as animation as the animatic doubles all these, making it impos-
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sible to say which is which, producing a double invagination/cryptic incorporation of each
in the other—a doubled womb that is at the same time a doubled tomb.4 9
In ‘sum’, the elements of the Cryptic Complex offer a way of conceptualising film rich
in implication, including for the thinking of the sense(s) of cinema and for the rethinking of
received theories of cinema, including those of ideology, the imaginary, fetishism, narr a t i v e ,
spectatorship, identification. From this point of view, that of the necrospective, that of the
vanishing point of view, e v e ry film and every analysis is a tale from, and of, the cry p t ,
making it necessary to rethink cinema, each and every modality of it, through the ghost, the
s p e c t re, the Cryptic Complex5 0—the animatic—to conceive of cinema, of film, as s p e c t ro -
g r a p h y (the writing of the spectre—ghost writing), as c ry p t o g r a p h y (the writing of the cry p t ) ,
as t h a n a t o g r a p h y (the writing of death); to conceive of spectatorship, as of analysis, as
s p e c t reship, as haunting and being haunted, as encrypting, as mourning and melancholia
in perpetuity, no matter what other affects might be generated to cover them over. F rom this
point of view, there is always a spectre and a speculator in the spectator–analyst, always a
corpse and a crypt. In fact, the spectres are always in the plural; and they are never laid to
rest, never resolved, never reconciled. So too the analysis of the crypt is itself ‘the crypt of
an analysis’.5 1
Let me close with words from The Rubiyat of Omar Khayam, which for Ian Christie in his
book The Last Machine o ffers a description of human existence in the light of the magic lantern .
I wonder, might that lantern have been J.A.R. Rudge’s B i o p h a n t o s c o p e, which means the view
of the life of the ghost, the view of the ghost of life. These words serve as well for our
c rypt, our haunted house, of cinema:
For in and out, above, about, below,
’tis nothing but a magic shadow-show,
Played in a box whose candle is the sun
Round which we phantom figures come and go.5 2
Send in the ghosts?5 3
D o n ’t bother. They’re here .
In this Kingdom of Shadows.
— — — — — — — — — —
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